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Abstract 
 
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily 
represent those of the Armenian International Policy Research Group. Working Papers describe 
research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. 
 
This paper explores factors of economic decline in the small republican economies of the 
former USSR. It develops quantitative estimates of the costs of major transitional shocks for 
Armenia during the early transition, including the direct impact of terms of trade shock (price 
shock), direct impact of external demand shock (market loss), direct impact of fiscal shock (loss of 
transfers), as well as secondary effects of all the above shocks, defined as a further decline in 
macroeconomic aggregates due to a weakening of the overall domestic demand. These estimates 
are obtained within a single framework, built on a detailed input-output model for Armenia, and 
using the actual 1987 data. 
 
Our estimates suggest that the cumulative impact of the external shocks of the early 90-s 
amounted to the equivalent of 85 percent of the pre-transition GDP, and both price and demand 
shocks were highly significant. At the same time, the fiscal shock was much less important in 
Armenia due to its lower dependence on transfers from the union budget. The actual economic 
decline in Armenia in the first part of the 90-s was less severe than the model’s projections. We 
attribute this difference to a positive impact of market reforms on economic incentives.  
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Introduction 
 The average depth of recession in Central and Eastern European economies, 
especially in the Former Soviet Union (FSU), during the early years of transition was very 
significant, especially given the mostly peaceful character of the transformation. For 
economists and other observers, this came unexpectedly and has not yet been  fully 
explained. From the analytical perspective, this economic decline may be attributed to two 
groups of factors:  
 
(i) unavoidable costs of transition associated with the disappearance of explicit and 
implicit subsidies, economic liberalization, and political disintegration; and 
(ii) excessive and potentially avoidable costs that relate to mistakes in the reform 
strategy, e.g., delays pertaining to  critical structural reforms, too rapid a pace of 
transformation, and/or inconsistencies in stabilization efforts.  
 
Moreover, Armenia and several other economies in transition were affected by 
regional conflicts that made an additional contribution to the economic decline of the early 
90-s. 
 
It seems rather important to be able to separate the relative contributions of these 
various groups of factors. This is worth doing not just from a historical and/or theoretical 
perspective, but also due to its importance for ongoing policy discussions on reform 
strategies in several countries in transition. In many countries, Armenia included, the 
transition has thus  far produced considerable losses in average household incomes. This 
made general public attitudes towards both government economic policies in the 90-s and 
market reforms quite negative. The public perception seems to ignore unavoidable costs of 
transition and to overestimate costs of reforms, and, therefore, tends to over-criticize those 
who implemented the early market reforms.  
 
Moreover, a better understanding of the factors that caused industrial contraction in 
early transition is quite important for a more adequate assessment of countries’ prospects 
for economic recovery, as well as for developing policy recommendations, including 
identification of potential options for industrial policy. In Armenia and elsewhere, 
insufficient understanding of the recent economic decline’s true causes still affects the 
local debate about longer-term economic strategies. There are continuing pressures in favor 
of modifying the current mostly liberal and fiscally responsible strategy, specifically 
pushing for more budget support of traditional industrial enterprises. These pressures, at 
least in part, derive from the fact that the general public still has an incorrect understanding 
of the role played by pre-transition subsidies in the economic wellbeing of Armenia, and 
therefore has rather unrealistic expectations about traditional Soviet industries’ potential 
for recovery, as well as about related possibilities for job creation and poverty reduction. 
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This paper aims to develop quantitative estimates of the costs of major transitional 
shocks (i.e. for “unavoidable costs”) for Armenia during the early transition, including: 
 
a) Direct impact of terms of trade shock, defined as deterioration of real incomes due 
to economic liberalization and shifts in domestic prices towards prices of the world 
market; 
 
b) Direct impact of external demand shock (market loss), defined as export losses due 
to the opening of traditional export markets to global competition and the 
deterioration of overall demand in these traditional markets; 
 
c) Direct impact of fiscal shock, defined as removal of traditional explicit budget and 
quasi-budget external transfers; 
 
d) Secondary effects of all the above shocks, defined as a further decline in 
macroeconomic aggregates due to weakening of the overall domestic demand, 
which was triggered by external factors a), b), and c).  
 
These estimates are obtained within a single framework, built on a detailed input-
output model for Armenia. The model allows one to estimate the direct and indirect effects 
of these shocks by changing main external parameters of the model, such as prices, 
demand (external and domestic), and fiscal transfers. We also compare our estimates for 
total unavoidable costs of transition with the actual economic contraction in Armenia in 
1988-1994. We then use this comparison as an indirect measure of “avoidable” costs of 
transition – costs associated with “wrong” reform policies of  the early 90-s. 
 
1. Analytical Framework  
 
This paper follows the framework suggested by Rodrick (1992) for the analysis of 
output trends in  Central Europe during the early transition, which distinguishes between 
price shocks, shocks related to a loss of traditional markets, and secondary effects, 
associated with an income multiplier.  We expand this approach to include fiscal shocks, 
associated with the elimination of fiscal and quasi-fiscal transfers to Armenia from the 
consolidated budget of the FSU1.  
 
 It is worth clarifying that we are interested in estimating the impact of transitional 
shocks on the country’s incomes, not just on outputs and/or value added created in the 
local economy. This is an important clarification, partially in light of the highly 
provocative paper by Anders Aslund (2001), in which he calls the major initial output 
contraction in transition economies a “myth”. He argues that the pre-transition output was 
largely inflated, and, more importantly, that a large chunk of what was produced was not 
actually needed – many enterprises in manufacturing subtracted value instead of producing 
it. Therefore, the actual decline in value added produced has been much smaller than the 
data on gross output may suggest. 
                                                 
1 In Armenia, explicit budget transfers were insignificant before the 1988 earthquake. 
 5 
 
 It seems important to distinguish between two parts of the problem. First, while it is 
true that most firms in socialist manufacturing were less productive than those in the West 
and were  subsidized by low input and energy prices, it is not parallel  to say that most of 
them were “value subtractors.” It is worth avoiding an over-statement of the low 
productivity issue. A more balanced assessment suggests that after opening local markets 
for international competition, domestic producers in all transition economies lost a 
considerable part of their domestic market to more productive external competitors, and 
this indeed resulted in a significant decline in the total locally generated output, 
employment, and value-added2, which had direct implications for total domestic 
consumption. Second, in addition to this effect of increased competition, incomes were 
affected by another and seemingly much more powerful process: the disintegration of the 
Soviet bloc resulted in the elimination of various types of cross-border income transfers. 
However, as Aslund describes it, this kind of income loss should not be linked to the 
economic transition and costs of reforms. These are the costs of the political process, the 
price paid by the newly independent states for their political independence. 
 
The comparative analysis of contributions made by various transitional shocks to the 
output decline is not well documented. In the first part of the 90-s, a considerable amount 
of research was conducted to explore the magnitude of term-of-trade (TOT) shocks in the 
FSU3, while other types of shocks (market and transfer losses) received much less 
attention, primarily due to a lack of  data.  
 
However, a TOT-based approach, i.e. one aimed at comparative analysis of 
changes in export and import prices after the price shock, cannot generate comprehensive 
estimates of transitional shocks because:  
 
a) It does not cover other transitional shocks related to a loss of traditional markets 
and transfers;  
b) It covers only direct income losses and does not include indirect effects on the 
economy through inter-sectoral linkages. 
 
Moreover, the TOT-based approach has a more general methodological constraint.  
The whole traditional TOT concept of price shock analysis relates to the examination of 
the impact of price movements on balance of payment (BOP) and debt, but not on GDP 
and incomes. The implicit assumption is that after the TOT has changed and an additional 
gap in balance of payments has emerged, some financing of this new gap could be found 
(at least in the short term) and no immediate impact on demand (and GDP) would follow. 
Thus, the major concern within this traditional approach relates to the impact of terms-of-
trade shock on debt and exchange rates, which may in turn later affect GDP (but 
indirectly). But the situation in the FSU in the early 90-s was different because the newly 
independent states did not have much access to external financing. They could not respond 
to the price shock by increasing borrowings, but instead had to make drastic cuts in 
                                                 
2 And, as is the case for any liberalization, related gains from increased value added in expanding 
competitive/exporting sectors came with some delays. 
3 Tarr (1993, 1994), Belkindas and Sagers (1990), Brown and Belkindas (1990), Orlovski (1993). 
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imports and consumption. Thus, it is important to reflect this specificity of the trade 
shock’s impact in the FSU in the underlying model. 
 
An even more important methodological constraint on estimating the effect of price 
shock within the TOT-based approach relates to difficulties of conversion of TOT index 
(which is a measure of price changes) into meaningful estimates of domestic income 
losses. Equation (1) presents the most logical way to estimate the share of gross domestic 
income lost due to price changes. It is calculated as a difference between two trade 
balances, in old and new prices, divided by GDP, and utilizing an appropriate index of 
price changes. 
 
InLoss = (TrBal (1) – TrBal (0)*Defl) / (GDP(0)*Defl) , where:      (1) 
 
InLoss – losses in real incomes, caused by terms of trade changes 
TrBal (1) and TrBal (0) – nominal trade balance after and before the price shock, in new 
and old prices respectively 
GDP(0) – GDP of the base year 
Defl – deflator, reflecting the magnitude of price change 
 
The problem with this formula in relation to the economies in transition derives 
from the fact that it is very difficult to measure pre-transition GDP in new (i.e. world 
market) prices. Because the official Soviet exchange rate (1 Rbl = 1.67$) was heavily 
overestimated, it cannot be used, while its proxies for formula (1*) are not easily available. 
 
InLoss = (TrBal (1) – TrBal (0)* InExRate) / (GDP(0)* InExRate) , (1*) 
 
where InExRate – a proxy for exchange rate between Soviet ruble and $US  
 
 
Researchers have had to develop various second best techniques to address this 
problem. For instance, David Tarr (1993, 1994) introduced the following formula to assess 
the TOT impact on the GDP, which tries to avoid the exchange rate problem:  
 
TOT Impact = TOT Index * Intensity of trade, where:           (2) 
 
TOT Index – the ratio of changes in export and import prices,  
Intensity of trade – the share of trade flows (export and import combined) in GDP 
 
We believe that such an approach produces rather non-robust estimates. For 
illustrative purposes, we compared the results generated by Tarr with an alternative simple 
proxy, which is based on an alternative estimate for the exchange rate of the pre-transition 
ruble. We estimated such a “shadow” exchange rate (InExRate) as the  geometrical mean 
of changes in export and import prices. That is, our shadow exchange rate is an average of 
exchange rates estimated separately for export and import flows. It is impossible to 
determine a priori which of these two formulas for estimating the TOT impact on GDP, 
defined in (1*) and (2), is more accurate. 
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Table 1 provides the results of our alternative estimates and compares them with 
those reported by Tarr (1994). Note that we use the same original 1990 trade and price data 
for 105 sectors of the Soviet economy as Tarr did. In three out of four cases we obtained 
much larger estimates of the direct impact losses than those reported by Tarr. In particular,  
we estimated that direct income loss in Armenia amounted to 11.1percent of 1990 GDP, 
compared to 7.6 percent of GDP, as estimated by Tarr.4 
 
Table 1. Direct Income losses in selected FSU states as a result of a switch to world 
market prices. Preliminary estimates deriving from the TOT approach. 
 
 Armenia, 
1990 
Georgia, 
1990 
Moldova, 
1990 
Estonia, 
1990 
Armenia, 
1987/88 
      
Total exports, Rbl 3522.7 5983.2 6176.7 3097.7 4115 
Total exports, USD 2053.2 3152.7 2941.8 2067.6 2473 
Index of export prices , InEx 0.583 0.527 0.476 0.667 0.601 
Total imports, Rbl 4868.4 6839.2 6461.4 3898.3 4251 
Total imports, USD 3654.6 5365.7 5784.2 3462.2 3437 
Index of import prices, InIm 0.751 0.785 0.895 0.888 0.809 
Terms-of-Trade Index, TRT  0.776 0.672 0.532 0.752 0.743 
Trade Balance, Rbl -1345.7 -856.0 -284.7 -800.6 -136.0 
Trade Balance, USD -1601.4 -2213.0 -2842.4 -1394.6 -964.0 
Income loss, USD -711.3 -1662.6 -2656.5 -778.2 -869.2 
Income loss, % of GDP -11.1 -17.3 -31.9 -12.7 -15.4 
Memo: Income loss as estimated 
by Tarr (1993), as % of GDP 
-7.6 0 -16.1 -12.7 n.a. 
      
GDP, rbl 9692 14915 12750 7977 8101 
Proxy GDP deflator  0.661 0.643 0.653 0.770 0.697 
GDP, in USD 6410.9 9589.8 8325.2 6141.7 5646.9 
      
Note: TRT=InEx/InIm 
Source: Tarr (1993), own estimates 
 
The last column of Table 1 contains our own estimates for Armenia for 1987/88 that 
are based on the completely different approach developed below in this paper and 
explained in the following sections. The approach derives from re-estimating the entire 
pre-transition Armenian economy in world prices through a desegregated input-output 
model (IOM). We believe that this is a much more accurate approach to assessing an 
exchange rate proxy InExRate and thus the overall impact of the trade shock on incomes.  
Note that our earlier proxy estimate for Armenia’s (column 1: 11.1 percent of GDP) is 
much closer to this estimate derived from the IOM model (last column: 15.4 percent of 
GDP) than Tarr’s estimate. This may suggest that Tarr’s estimates for Armenia (and likely 
                                                 
4 Still, it is worth noting that even these initial, downwards biased estimates show that the TOT shock in the 
small CIS economies was on average much more severe than in CEE countries. As estimated by Rodrick  
(1992) this effect amounted to 7.8 percent of GDP for Hungary, 3.5 percent for Poland, and close to zero for 
Romania. 
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for Georgia and Moldova) underestimate income losses. It is also worth noting that, based 
on our estimates, one could argue that Armenia was less affected by the price shock than 
Georgia and Moldova. 
 
Another traditional difficulty with the assessment of transitional shocks derives from 
the lack of reliable data on inter-republican income transfers in the former USSR. In Soviet 
times, balance of payments was never properly estimated for the former Soviet republics. 
Brown and Belkindas (1990) show that standard Soviet statistics of output and 
consumption were not helpful in developing an accurate measure of income redistribution 
in the FSU. This is because the main macroeconomic aggregates were seriously distorted, 
in particular by a biased accounting of main taxes and subsidies. Also, the Soviet statistics 
of national output and trade did not account for most services and did not reflect a regional 
breakdown of consumption of all-union services, such as defense. 
 
At the same time, Brown and Belkindas (1990) suggest a framework for developing 
proxy BOP estimates. These could be based on the traditional trade balance and then 
adjusted for balance of major channels of inter-republican financial redistribution, such as 
profit tax, turnover tax, investment funds of sectoral ministries, and budget subsidies. 
Brown and Belkindas believe that such financial adjustments could be obtained from 
Central Bank sources. They also report on the Estonian BOP of late 80-s, which was 
reconstructed based on various local sources of information.  We follow this approach to 
estimate Armenian BOP for 1987 in the next section. 
 
2. Armenia: depth and factors of economic decline in the early 90-s 
 
Initial conditions: Industrial structure and endowments 
 
Armenia was one of the most industrially developed parts of the former Soviet 
Union. In the period between 1960 and 1987, the Armenian economy experienced a period 
of rapid growth, with a  gross output increase of 830percent. Being a part of the Soviet 
industrial complex, the Armenian industrial sector was specialized in the production of 
chemicals, electronics, radio- and electromechanical components, tools and instruments, 
precious metals and stones processing, and agricultural processing.  
Table 2 suggests that overall by the end of the Soviet period Armenia had a more 
industrialized economy and a more educated labor force that the FSU average. The 
Armenian population had higher incomes and experienced higher levels of core social 
indicators, including those related to population health and access to main services and 
consumer goods. 
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Table 2. Development indicators for selected FSU economies in 1990 
 
 Armenia Georgia Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Russian 
Federation 
USSR 
Average salary, Rubles 241.3 214.0 219.2 297.8 274.6 
Average deposit in 
Savings Bank, Rubles 
2,794 2,459 1,416 1,732 1,734 
College educated 
population, %* 
13.8 15.1 9.4 11.3 10.8 
College graduates per 
10,000 inhabitants 
31 30 21 27 26 
Number of doctors per 
10,000 inhabitants 
43 59 36 46.9 44.2 
Output of industrial 
consumer goods per 
capita, Rubles 
1,740 1,546 884 1,664 1,598 
Industrial employment, 
% of total 
30.3 20.3 19.1 30.2 26.6 
Infant mortality per 
1000 newborn 
18.6 15.9 30.0 17.4 21.8 
Life expectancy at birth 71.8 72.8 68.8 69.3 69.3 
*Among population 15 years of age and older.  
Source: Goskomstat (1990)   
 
The Armenian economy was relatively open, with the volume of external trade 
amounting to 103percent of GDP in 1987, which was rather common for the smaller FSU 
republics.  1987 exports in domestic currency terms amounted to more than 50percent of 
GDP, and the trade balance was close to zero. The manufacturing sector dominated  overall 
exports, making up more than 95percent of the total. Among the individual sectors, the 
light industry5 had the biggest share, at 37.7percent, followed by machinery, food and 
chemical industries with 25.2, 14.3 and 10.0percent respectively. At the same time, before 
independence, Armenia was practically isolated from the rest of the world. For instance, in 
1988 only about 2percent of Armenian exports were shipped outside of the FSU.  
 
Armenia also had a rather developed network of research facilities, with 25.3 
thousand people involved in R&D6 in 1991, of which 17.2 thousand were researchers. 
                                                 
5 Light industry includes textiles, footwear, leather, and garments among its primary components.  
6 Total industrial employment in 1990 amounted to about 400,000. 
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They received 400-500 patents per year in Soviet times. Even in 1998, after a considerable 
contraction, almost a hundred of organizations reported that they were involved in R&D. 
 
Major transitional shocks 
 
The pre-transition structure of Armenia’s economy, especially industry, proved to be 
quite vulnerable to external shocks. This was primarily due to the role played by big 
industrial plants that produced mostly intermediary goods, with both suppliers and 
customers located in the rest of the FSU. These “core” industrial enterprises did not have a 
sufficient volume of internal linkages to other Armenian firms, and at the same time they 
had too little of their own marketing and development capacity, which would dramatically 
limit their ability to respond to external shocks, including through changes in their output 
mix and/or by entering new export markets7. Most of the industry operated on the 
“enclave” model (i.e., without a strong local base to support sustainable development). 
Such a high dependence on export of parts, components, and tools (especially for defense 
use) to other FSU states, which accounted for about 40percent of total industrial export, as 
well as on imports of raw materials, played a critical role in the steep decline of industrial 
output in the early 90-s.  
 
 Another large chunk of industrial exports were derived from light manufacturing, 
such as textiles, garments, and footwear. Both the productivity of these companies and the 
quality of their output was low by international standards, which made them vulnerable to 
trade liberalization.  
 
Overall, the old industrial core of the Armenian economy could not be sustained 
after the disintegration of the FSU and market liberalization due to a number of factors that 
included: 
 
a) a sharp decline in defense and other final demand in Russia and other FSU states; 
b) the low competitiveness of Armenian goods, especially in the consumer sector, after 
energy and other subsidies had been withdrawn: FSU markets were lost to competitors 
from lower-cost countries, e.g. Turkey and China;  
c) political factors that pushed Russian producers (e.g. in defense industries) to switch to 
local suppliers; 
d) new cost factors, such as increased transportation costs for Armenian goods; 
e) excessive size of many traditional enterprises, which, when external markets were lost, 
could not be efficiently re-oriented to work primarily for the domestic market; most of 
them cannot be profitable at a low rate of capacity utilization. 
 
In short, the vulnerabilities of Armenia’s industrial structure could be summarized 
as “too many of the wrong enterprises operated in the wrong sectors.” As in several other 
small FSU economies, most industrial output in Armenia was produced in sectors that 
were implicitly subsidized. These subsidies were derived either from lower prices of 
energy, metal and raw materials or through protection from international competition or 
                                                 
7 At the same time, local R&D establishments in many cases were technologically linked to industrial 
complexes elsewhere in the FSU.  
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both. All such economies, in which energy and other primary sectors were relatively 
under-developed, were significantly affected by the price shock in early transition that was 
triggered by price and trade liberalization.  
 
Table 3 illustrates cross-sectoral differences in the price response to liberalization 
in the early transition. In the first years of transition, prices in “good” sectors (i.e., those 
that benefited from price liberalization) grew 4-7 times faster than in the “bad” ones (i.e., 
sectors  that had been either subsidized or over-priced or both).  Price liberalization, which 
was largely completed in Armenia by 1995, exposed three main sectors of the Armenian 
economy (machinery, light/textiles, and food processing) to a severe income contraction. 
Overall, about ¾ of the total industrial production and 77percent of total exports were 
affected by the negative price shock. 
 
Table 3. Armenia: price indexes by industrial by-sectors, 1988-94 (1988 = 100) 
 
Total Industry 1,127,214 
Positively affected sectors:   
Electric energy 3,973,007 
Chemical and petrochemical 4,638,476 
Non-ferrous metallurgy 4,015,691 
Negatively affected sectors:   
Food industry, incl. flour-mills 1,122,099 
Light industry  652,388 
Machinery and metal processing 852,317 
Sector with a neutral impact  
Forestry and wood processing  2,775,967 
Construction materials industry 2,629,977 
Source: NSS 
 
 Table 4 presents a simple measure of structural pre-transition vulnerability for 
selected FSU economies. It compares the shares of “good” and “bad” sectors in the total 
industrial output before the transition, and adjusts this ratio for contribution of the industry 
into GDP generation. The constructed index provides a clear distinction between energy 
and metal exporting FSU economies (such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan) and energy and 
metal importing ones. The table suggests that the Baltic states, Moldova, and Kyrgyzstan 
were the most vulnerable to the price shocks (for these economies, the index exceeds 1.8). 
Compared to these states, the industrial structures of Georgia and Armenia (before the 
earthquake) were slightly less vulnerable. However, as a result of additional distortions 
that emerged after the earthquake, by 1990 the index for the Armenian economy8 increased 
to the levels of those in Moldova and Kyrgyzstan.  
  
                                                 
8 It is important to make an explicit adjustment for deterioration in Armenian economy after the earthquake. 
Many estimates about Armenia’s dependence on intra-USSR transfers tend to be upwards biased because 
they are made based on the 1989-90 data. 
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Table 4. Index of structural vulnerability for selected FSU states. 
 
 Armenia, 
88 
Armenia, 
90 
Azerbaija
n 
Estonia Latvia Georgia Kazakhsta
n 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Moldova 
          
All Industry 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
         ` 
Heavy Industry 54.1 61.3 47.4 44.8 46.7 39.1 64.0 44.1 39.8 
Fuel and Energy 3.9 3.5 14.1 5.9 2.6 3.5 13.0 5.0 3.5 
Electricity    3.7 4.1 0.0 2.4 5.2 4.1 3.5 
Fuels    10.5 1.8 0.0 1.1 7.8 0.9 0.0 
Ferrous and Non-
ferrous Metallurgy 
4.1 3.2 3.4 0.0 1.3 3.8 16.5 4.4 1.0 
Chemicals and 
Petrochemical Industry 
6.9 4.0 5.7 6.5 9.1 3.7 6.5 0.6 3.1 
Machine Building and 
Metalworking 
31.6 32.8 16.0 14.1 26.8 14.3 15.9 24.6 17.8 
Forestry, 
Woodworking, and 
Pulp and Paper 
2.3 2.1 1.7 8.1 3.2 3.3 2.8 1.5 3.4 
Construction Materials 5.3 4.7 2.8 4.4 3.6 5.1 5.7 4.4 3.9 
Light Industry 24.4 24.6 17.4 18.5 19.1 21.2 15.6 27.5 21.1 
Textiles 11.3 9.7 12.5 12.8   12.2 9.5 20.4 9.9 
Garments 9.3 10.4 3.2 3.1   7.5 4.2 5.0 7.2 
Leather and Shoes 3.9 4.5 1.6 2.5   1.3 1.8 2.1 3.9 
Food Industry 16.7 13.2 22.8 24.1 25.1 37.4 16.2 24.9 39.1 
Processed Foods   8.9 20.0 4.7   32.9 6.5 18.3 28.6 
Meat and Dairy 
Products 
 4.0 2.6 12.2   3.6 9.2 6.5 7.9 
Fish  0.3 0.3 7.2   0.9 0.5 0.0 0.2 
Other industries 4.8 1.0 12.3 12.6 9.1 2.4 4.2 3.6 0.0 
           
“Good” sectors 
(energy, metal, chem.) 
14.9 10.7 23.2 12.4 13.0 11.0 36.0 10.1 7.6 
“Bad” sectors (light, 
mash., food) 
72.7 70.5 56.2 56.7 71.1 72.9 47.7 76.9 78.0 
   Ratio 4.9 6.6 2.4 4.6 5.4 6.6 1.3 7.6 10.3 
Share of industry in 
GDP 
35 30.2 22 39.6 35.1 22.9 21 26.4 20 
Index of structural 
vulnerability 
1.71 2.00 0.53 1.81 1.91 1.52 0.28 2.02 2.05 
Source: Belkindas and Ivanova (1995) and own estimates 
 
 
Balance of payment for Soviet Armenia 
 
As part of our analysis of transitional shocks, we have tried to reconstruct 
Armenia’s BOP (Table 4), based on the recommendations of Brown and Belkindas (1990). 
We started from the traditional trade balance and then adjusted it for:  
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a) purchases made by migrants (Armenia had negative balance of Rbl 300 mln9);  
b) the balance of financial flows, having obtained the following information on 
main financial inter-republican flows for Armenia: budget transfers and 
subsidies; profit and turnover taxes; investment grants funded by sectoral 
ministries; payroll taxes and pension payments. 
 
We believe that, before the transition, Armenia’s deficit of trade account 
(merchandise only) amounted to approximately  5.4percent of GDP.  These estimates do 
not reflect the balance of service account, for which it seems difficult to get any reliable 
statistics. Given the fact that the service sector in the USSR was heavily under-developed 
compared to the industry and traditional infrastructure, and because most services were 
locally consumed, inter-republic trade in services was relatively small, except for tourism 
and travel, for which our estimates amounted to -3.2percent of GDP. In addition, given the 
lack of official statistics, we may simply speculate that Armenia, as well as some other 
smaller FSU republics, were likely to run a deficit for trade in other services. This is 
because they had non-proportional access to educational, health, and R&D services 
provided free or almost free by centrally located institutions (in Moscow and other major 
urban centers in the rest of the FSU) that were funded from the union budget10. This may 
amount to a further increase of 1.5percent of GDP in Armenia’s current account deficit.  
 
Overall, our estimates suggest that, before the transition, Armenia has been running 
a negative balance of trade in goods and services on the order of 10percent of GDP (sum of 
lines 1 and 4).  
 
Finally, we looked into the intensity of financial flows between Armenia and the 
central budget of the former USSR. It is worth noting that the system of inter-budgetary 
transfers in the FSU was rather complicated, with a number of parallel channels. In recent 
research, it is not uncommon to simplify the picture of fiscal re-distribution between the 
former Soviet Republics by over-emphasizing the role of budget transfers/subsidies 
provided by the central budget to republican budgets. As it is shown in Table 5, such inter-
budgetary transfers (line 11) represented only one of several re-distribution channels, and 
in the case of Armenia it was relatively insignificant (about 2percent of GDP).  
 
Our estimates suggest that Armenia indeed received a considerable amount of 
financial resources from the central budget, which were coming mainly through the 
investment financing (12.7percent of GDP) done by the USSR sectoral ministries of their 
mostly industrial projects located in Armenia. In addition, Armenia received transfers 
through the USSR pension system (3.3percent of GDP). Overall, however, the balance of 
current transfers in Armenia was negative (-6.6percent of GDP) due to major tax payments 
made by Armenian enterprises to the USSR budget. This is an important source of funding: 
it suggests that, despite getting some budget subsidies, on balance Armenia did not receive 
transfers from the central budget to support its current incomes and consumption. 
                                                 
9 As reported by Brown and Belkindas (1990). 
10 We assume that Armenia would have a fully balanced account for tourism-related services. 
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The overall current account deficit in Armenia in 1987 was very large, in excess of 
16percent of GDP, and was financed primarily by the USSR central investment budget 
(which would be an equivalent of FDI in the more traditional BOP presentation). The 
remaining deficit financing was coming through central government financing of all-union 
services such as defense (for which we do not have information) and through worker 
remittances. 
 
While from the transition perspective, this was quite a high deficit of both trade and 
current accounts, we believe its actual impact on post-1991 developments in Armenia was 
modest. When the traditional central sources of investment financing disappeared after the 
collapse of the USSR, this loss (all other factors remains intact) could be almost fully 
compensated through Armenia’s gains associated with the disappearance of taxes to the 
union budget (lines 8 and 9).  
 
We estimate that on a net basis, Soviet Armenia received annual financial transfers 
on the order of 6-8percent of GDP. As follows from the analysis below, this is a much 
smaller amount than the implicit price subsidy received by the Armenian economy.  The 
bottom line of our analysis of the 1987 BOP suggests that the withdrawal of USSR 
financial transfers (i.e., direct impact of fiscal shock) was relatively small when compared 
to other transitional shocks. If Armenia was affected by only a fiscal shock, it would have 
been able to mostly preserve the status quo, by financing its investment program from its 
own savings, including those that had earlier been taxed away. 
 
 
Table 5. Reconstruction of Armenian BOP, current mln rbl, 1987 
 
 Nominal % of GDP 
1. Trade balance (merchandise) = 2+3 -436 -5.4 
2. Merchandise trade balance -136 -1.7 
3. Purchases by migrants -300 -3.7 
4. Balance in services = 5+6 -380 -4.7 
5. Travel and tourism -260 -3.2 
6. Education, health, and R&D (*)  -120 -1.5 
7. Current Transfers = 8+9+10+11 -530 -6.6 
8. Turnover tax payable to USSR union budget -616 -7.6 
9. Profit tax payable to USSR union budget -331 -4.1 
10. Deficit of pension payments financed from USSR 
union budget 
271 3.3 
11. Inter-budgetary transfers (net) 146 1.9 
12. Balance of Current account = 1+4+7 -1346 -16.6 
13. Investment financed from the union budget sources 1030 12.7 
14. Net Borrowings -64 -0.8 
15. Discrepancy = 12+13+14 380 4.7 
Memo: Net Financing received = 7+13+14 436 5.4 
Memo: GDP 8101  
Source: Own estimates, Brown and Belkindas (1990). 
Note: (*) – very rough estimate 
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3. Quantitative analysis of external shocks for Armenia 
 
We aim to obtain four types of estimates.  
 
First.  We start with the actual input-output table of Armenia for 1987 and convert all its 
relevant entries into the world market prices. By doing this, we construct an illustrative 
picture of the Armenian economy in 1987, as it would have operated in an environment 
where all but a limited number of products are traded at world market prices, including in 
domestic transactions. The main input and output indicators obtained at this stage serve for 
an evaluation of the direct price shock effect. They are also used as the main data source 
for further analysis.  
 
Second. We estimate the direct impact of the external demand shock based on the actual 
dynamic of Armenian exports to Russia, which was Armenia’s major trading partner in 
1987. 
 
Third.  We evaluate the secondary effect – the impact of domestic demand shock triggered 
by terms of trade changes and external demand deterioration. This reflects a usual effect of 
multiplier: initial income losses of exporters, importers, and the Government being 
transmitted to their suppliers as well as to recipients of budget transfers. This estimate is 
based on the initial input-output table, in which a much lower final domestic demand has 
been introduced. 
 
Fourth. We estimate the cumulative impact of external and domestic shocks described 
above.  
 
Data 
 The base year for our analysis of the pre-transition Armenian economy is 1987, 
which is the most representative year from the late Soviet period. Due to the 1988 
earthquake, indicators for the following years, 1988-91, especially those related to output, 
exports, imports, and budget transfers, seriously deviated from their baseline of the mid 
80-s. At the same time, 1987 was the last year for which data for the disaggregated input-
output table are available. We used the IOM with the 110 main economic sectors. 
 
 Most data on the real sector are from the various publications of the Armenian 
National Statistical Service (NSS). Financial information was also provided by the Central 
Bank of Armenia (CBA) and the Ministry of Finance of Armenia. 
 
The price and trade data are from the USSR Goskomstat and  were provided for 
105 sectors, o/w 100 in industry (manufacturing, mining, and energy), 2 in agriculture, 3 in 
services. 
 
Armenian pre-transition economy in world market prices 
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We have constructed price conversion coefficients for each sector of the traditional 
FSU industrial classification. This is done based on the export and import data in domestic 
original and world prices that are available from the USSR Goskomstat for each republic, 
including Armenia. This procedure is very similar to the one done by Tarr (1994) and 
Orlovski (1993), and resulted in a similar set of coefficients. To convert Input-Output 
accounts into world market prices for each sector, we followed the procedure described in 
Annex 1. 
 
 Table 6 reflects the main results of our re-estimation of the Armenian economy into 
the world market prices (WMP).  We received a picture of the economy that had a GDP of 
US$ 5.2 billion (in 1987 dollars), which is equivalent to $1400 of GDP per capita. It also 
remains a highly open economy, with exports reaching 47percent of GDP, and the overall 
degree of openness reaching 113percent.    
 
Table 6. Armenian economy in world market prices, results of conversion, 1987 
 
  
1987 
Domestic 
Price 
Terms 
1987 World Market Price 
Terms (Option 1) 
1987 World Market Price 
Terms (Option 2) 
  
Thousands 
of Rubles 
Thousands 
of US 
Dollars 
Price 
Conversion 
Coefficients, 
dollars per 1 
ruble 
Thousands 
of US 
Dollars 
Price 
Conversion 
Coefficients, 
dollars per 1 
ruble 
Output 16,381,684 12,044,537 0.74 11,211,090 0.68 
Intermediary Inputs 8,280,381 6,827,089 0.82 6,789,715 0.82 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  8,101,303 5,217,448 0.64 4,421,374 0.55 
Export 4,114,937 2,472,846 0.60 2,472,846 0.60 
Import 4,250,804 3,437,308 0.81 3,437,308 0.81 
Trade Balance -135,867 -964,461 N/A -964,461 N/A 
     - as  % of GDP -1.70 -18.50 N/A -0.22 N?A 
Total final demand 8,201,928 6,167,347 0.75 5,385,836 0.66 
Private Final Consumption 4,395,203 2,405,270 0.55 2,314,701 0.53 
Government Consumption 1,025,536 1,025,536 1.00 728,370 0.71 
Gross Capital Formation 2,685,070 2,736,541 1.02 2,342,765 0.87 
Note: Options 1 and 2 differ in a way of estimating the non-tradable part of the economy and they are 
described in Annex 1. All further analysis and simulations are based on the results of conversion received 
under Option 1. 
 
Price shock 
 
In line with the discussion in Section 1, we have been using two measures of the 
terms of trade shock: 
 
• Terms of Trade Index (TOT) reflects changes in import volumes that could be 
funded by the same exports volume. The index is calculated as the ratio of the total 
exports price index to the total imports price index, whereas the total export 
(import) index is calculated as total export (import) volume in current domestic 
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prices of the reference (1987) year divided by total export (import) volume in world 
market prices of the same year.  
 
• Imputed Trading Loss (TL) measures losses in real Gross Domestic Income caused 
by terms of trade changes and calculated by subtracting the trade balance in world 
market prices from trade balance in current domestic prices, deflated by an 
appropriate index (see also formulas (1) and (1*) above). To assess the sensitivity 
of our results, we used three different deflators: import price index (TL import), 
export price index (TL export) and final demand index (TL demand).11 
 
Table 7 presents our main results for the impact of the price shock. Given the 
structural weaknesses of the Armenian economy discussed above, the shift towards world 
market prices indeed produced significant negative changes in terms of trade and generated 
substantial income losses.  The decline in export prices was much deeper than the one for 
import prices. The deterioration of the trade balance amounted to about 17percent of 
(dollarized) GDP, from –1.7percent to –18.5percent of GDP.  Obviously, income losses of 
this magnitude would have a lasting downward effect on the economy, pushing it to a new 
lower level of equilibrium. The size of the losses, while still very significant, was 
somewhat smaller in 1988-89. This is in part due to the administrative price reform 
introduced in the USSR in the late 80-s, which resulted in somewhat diminished 
discrepancies between the world market and domestic prices. This is also due to a major 
change in the composition of import flow to Armenia after the earthquake. 
 
Table 7.  External Trade, Terms of Trade Index and Trading Losses, 1987-1990 
 
  
1987 1988 1989 1990 
Export, Import and trade balance in world market prices  
(millions of dollars of the reference year) 
Export in world market prices 2 472.90  2 247.90  2 333.60  2 062.80  
Import in world market prices 3 437.00  3 611.60  3 711.00  3 676.30  
Trade Balance -964.10  -1 363.70  -1 377.40  -1 613.50  
Export, import, and trade balance in actual prices  
(million of current rubles) 
Export in current prices 4 114.90  3 767.00  3 658.80  3 522.70  
Import in current prices 4 250.80  4 876.30  4 897.80  4 868.40  
Trade Balance -135.90  -1 109.30  -1 239.00  -1 345.70  
Hypothetical Trading Losses (TL) (million dollars) 
TL import -882.43  -701.74  -587.16  -825.49  
                                                 
11 We were able to estimate the Final Demand Index only for 1987 because we need the full input-output 
model for this. For 1988-1990 we produced only estimates that are based only on external trade price 
statistics. However, as the 1987 results suggest that the two these methods provide rather close estimates. 
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1987 1988 1989 1990 
TL export -854.22  -542.10  -438.63  -597.31  
TL final demand -861.91       
Export-Import price indices 
(volumes  in rubles of the reference year = 100) 
Total Exports Price Index 60.10  59.67  63.78  58.56  
Total Imports Price Index 80.86  74.06  75.77  75.51  
Total Final Demand Index  75.19       
Terms of Trade Index 74.33 80.57 84.18 77.55 
Source: Own calculations based on Goskomstat and Armstat statistics. 
Note: World price estimates for 1988, 1989 and 1990 are from Goskomstat, and own estimates are for 1987.  
 
In addition, at the sectoral level several core industries (especially food processing, 
textiles, and garments) experienced a substantial deterioration in their gross operating 
margins (defined as the difference between values of output and input per unit of output) 
due to unfavorable changes in relative prices. Table 8 and Figure 1 show the scale of this 
impact. They suggest that the overall consequences of the price liberalization were even 
more negative than as shown by the macro level data. In addition to the initial income loss, 
a number of domestic enterprises became unviable in the new price environment and had 
to stop operations completely. 
 
Table 8. Gross operating margins before and after converting to world market prices 
and world market price conversion ratios for 25 main industrial sectors, 1987 
 
Sectors 
Output. in 
thousands 
of current 
1987 
rubles 
Gross 
Operating 
Surpluses 
(in 1987 
ruble 
prices) 
Gross 
Operating 
Surpluses 
(in world 
market 
prices) 
Gross 
operating 
Margin in 
1987 
ruble 
prices 
Gross 
operating 
Margin in 
world 
market 
prices  
Output 
Price 
Conversion 
Ratio 
Input Price 
Conversion 
Ratio  
Output/ 
Input 
Relative 
price 
change  
  Garments 689.580.00 94.567.00 9.327.18 13.71% 4.12% 0.33 0.36 0.90 
  Tools and Parts 686.488.00 173.794.00 16.473.01 25.32% 3.57% 0.67 0.87 0.77 
  Knitted Products 617.555.00 306.454.00 55.645.90 49.62% 28.82% 0.31 0.44 0.71 
  Meat Products 567.332.00 15.956.00 124.346.34 2.81% 33.10% 0.66 0.46 1.45 
  Electro-Technical Parts 530.230.00 158.625.00 158.529.85 29.92% 28.66% 1.04 1.06 0.98 
  Wines 514.300.00 204.450.00 -12.561.44 39.75% -17.46% 0.14 0.27 0.51 
  Radio, Electronics Parts 495.091.00 155.934.00 97.315.99 31.50% 22.80% 0.86 0.97 0.89 
  Leather 459.620.00 146.687.00 37.420.97 31.91% 20.07% 0.41 0.48 0.85 
  Power 339.832.00 140.019.00 123.470.94 41.20% 24.34% 1.49 1.92 0.78 
 Other Instruments and  
 Machinery  315.041.00 21.824.00 52.543.60 6.93% 16.68% 1.00 0.90 1.12 
  Cotton Products (Tex- 
  tile and Garments) 268.677.00 26.014.00 -14.528.14 9.68% -15.29% 0.35 0.45 0.78 
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Sectors 
Output. in 
thousands 
of current 
1987 
rubles 
Gross 
Operating 
Surpluses 
(in 1987 
ruble 
prices) 
Gross 
Operating 
Surpluses 
(in world 
market 
prices) 
Gross 
operating 
Margin in 
1987 
ruble 
prices 
Gross 
operating 
Margin in 
world 
market 
prices  
Output 
Price 
Conversion 
Ratio 
Input Price 
Conversion 
Ratio  
Output/ 
Input 
Relative 
price 
change  
  Tobacco 267.429.00 102.656.00 3.174.48 38.39% 3.86% 0.31 0.48 0.64 
  Non-Ferrous Metals 261.530.00 41.045.00 143.116.41 15.69% 33.80% 1.62 1.27 1.27 
  Dairy Products 255.661.00 24.217.00 38.975.31 9.47% 26.07% 0.58 0.48 1.22 
  Wool Products (Tex- 
  tile and Garments) 244.885.00 71.513.00 4.821.06 29.20% 7.64% 0.26 0.34 0.77 
  Other Industries 233.086.00 47.869.00 28.935.35 20.54% 9.47% 1.31 1.49 0.88 
  Pre-fabricated Concrete 187.308.00 25.194.00 -49.312.83 13.45% -31.45% 0.84 1.27 0.66 
  Alcohols 180.075.00 168.425.00 7.047.54 93.53% 46.42% 0.08 0.70 0.12 
  Fruit & Vegetables 171.011.00 18.584.00 18.179.21 10.87% 17.86% 0.60 0.55 1.09 
  Machinery/Equipment 
  Repair 143.518.00 37.606.00 30.990.45 26.20% 21.59% 1.00 1.06 0.94 
  Confections 133.704.00 41.669.00 13.169.78 31.17% 20.97% 0.47 0.54 0.87 
  Bread and Bakery  
  Products 129.836.00 9.702.00 7.320.30 7.47% 8.85% 0.64 0.63 1.02 
  Synthetic Rubber 126.406.00 45.910.00 12.830.30 36.32% 13.51% 0.75 1.02 0.74 
  Furniture 121.661.00 36.960.00 -17.347.90 30.38% -34.49% 0.41 0.80 0.52 
  Machine Tools 110.503.00 27.192.00 39.927.04 24.61% 30.40% 1.19 1.10 1.08 
Weighted Average    26.26% 17.62% 0.65 0.74 0.87 
Source: Own estimates 
 
As may be seen from Table 8, the relative price changes for inputs outpaced those 
for outputs for 18 out of the 25 top industries. As a result, in world market price terms, 
gross operating margins declined below 10percent for 10 industrial sectors, indicating that 
these sectors most probably would become uncompetitive in the new price environment. 
Table 9 provides estimates for the magnitude of the potential output contraction due to low 
profitability. It reveals that conversion to WMP could result in more than 40percent of 
industrial output becoming unprofitable. 
 
Table 9.  Industries with low gross operating margins after conversion to World 
Market Prices, out of 100 industrial sectors 
 
Gross Operating 
margins Number of Industries 
Output in 1987 current 
prices  
 (million rubles) 
As percent of total 
1987 Industrial Output 
(percent) 
Negative 39  1978 18.4% 
5% and less 44  3760 34.9% 
10% and less 48  4424 41.1% 
 
Overall, for 7 out of 9 major aggregated sectors, which accounted for more than 
90percent of the total industrial output and almost the same share of total export in 1987, 
gross operating margins in world market prices deteriorated due to input-output relative 
price changes (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1.  Price shock effect on gross operating surpluses in main sectors   
 
 
  
 Demand shock 
 
 During the first years of transition, the deterioration in Armenia’s export 
performance was much more severe than the declines in GDP and output. As suggested in 
Table 5, in 1987 Armenian exports had a value of about US$ 2.5 billion in world market 
prices, or 47percent of GDP. Despite some recent improvements (1999-2002), current 
volumes of manufacturing exports account for not more than 20percent of its pre-
transitional level. 
 
Although there were several factors that contributed to this export collapse, 
including economic blockade and other supply side restrictions, the loss of external 
markets and extensive changes in relative prices seems to have made a key contribution to 
this process. 
 
There were three main components of the overall decline in external demand for 
Armenian goods in 1992-1993: 
 
1. Overall decline in import demand in the FSU, as well as a shift in the commodity 
composition of imports, caused by the collapse of regional income aggregates; 
 
2. Decline in the share of inter-FSU countries trade in the total FSU external trade, 
derived from the competitive pressures from the rest of the world; 
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3. Additional commodity/sector specific factors: in Armenia this effect was the most 
profound in the defense industry, as Russia and other FSU states went through a 
major (and well deserved) contraction in defense spending in the early 90-s; when 
this spending partially recovered later in the period, Armenian exports in the sector 
were effectively replaced by components and parts produced domestically by 
Russian firms. 
 
Our evaluation of the direct impact of external demand shock on Armenian export 
is based on the following assumptions and proxies: 
 
• Due to data limitations, changes in exports to Russia are selected to represent the 
demand trend for the entire FSU market. (Export to Russia are estimated to account 
for more than 70percent of the total Armenian export in 1987) 
• Armenian exports to Russia in the base year (1987) were converted into WMP with 
the price conversion factors that correspond to the entire Armenian export to the 
FSU.  
• It is assumed that the trend in Russia’s demand for Armenian exports was similar to 
Russia’s demand for overall FSU export; in other words, it is assumed that 
Armenian goods remained competitive in the Russian market relative to the similar 
goods produced in the other FSU republics, i.e. no substitution took place of 
Armenian import by imports from the rest of the FSU. 
• Only Armenia’s main export sectors were analyzed; we reviewed trends in Russian 
imports from the FSU for five leading sectors: machinery, light industry, food 
processing, power, and chemicals. Those sectors combined represented more than 
85percent of the total Armenian export in 1987. 
• It was additionally assumed that export demand in the (defense-related) part of the 
machinery sector declined by an additional 50percent compared to the decline 
reflected in the data on (mostly civilian) machinery imports, as reported by  official 
statistics.         
 
These main assumptions are summarized in Table 10. We estimate that the FSU 
demand for main Armenian manufacturing goods declined by 3-10 times, with the power 
(electricity) and machinery (engineering) sectors being the most affected. 
 
The decline in Armenian export to Russia/FSU for each industrial sector was 
estimated as the product of two sector-specific import indices for Russia:  
 
a) total index of import decline, calculated as the ratio of the total 1994 Russian imports in 
this sector (in US dollars) to the 1987 imports, valued in world market prices; and  
b) sector index of inter-FSU import intensity, calculated as the ratio of the 1987 share of 
FSU import in the total Russian imports in the sector to the respective share in 1994. 
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Table 10.  Impact of the demand shock on Armenia’s export to the FSU: specific 
estimates and assumptions. 
  
Estimated after 
shock export 
demand, % of 
1987 level 
Contribution of individual factors (total = 100) 
   
Imports 
decline in 
the FSU Competition 
Sector 
specific 
factors 
Power and Fuel 10% 100% 0% 0% 
Chemicals 35% 53% 47% 0% 
Machinery 10% 45% 5% 50% 
Light 24% 50% 50% 0% 
Food processing 17% 80% 20% 0% 
 
  
 
 Table 11 summarizes the main results of  the external demand shock. It suggests 
that because of  this,  Armenia lost about $2 billion in industrial exports (about 80percent 
of its export 1987 level or 25percent of its total pre-transition industrial output), which is 
equivalent to a loss of about $715 million or 8percent of the pre-transition GDP. 
 
Table 11. External Demand Shock -- Direct Impact  
 
Export in the 
Base year. in 
Domestic 
Prices 
Export in the 
Base year. in 
World market 
prices 
Export 
Decline due 
to demand 
Shock. as 
% of Export 
in WMP 
Export 
value. 
adjusted to 
External 
Demand 
Shock 
Export Losses 
due to 
External 
Demand 
Shock 
Direct Impact on the 
produced gross 
value added  
 1000 Rubles 1000 USD percent 1000 USD 1000 USD 1000 USD 
Power and Fuel 36 800 54 925 10% 5 493 -49 433 -18 150 
Metallurgy 140 271 177 533 35% 62 136 -115 396 -43 367 
Chemicals 409 479 306 356 35% 107 225 -199 131 -104 637 
Machinery 1 038 095 977 309 10% 100 201 -877 109 -386 436 
Light 1 549 540 508 572 24% 122 057 -386 514 -155 981 
Food 589 784 183 860 17% 31 347 -152 513 -36 954 
Other Industries 330 249 257 807 35% 90 233 -167 575 -84 596 
Total Industry 4 094 218 2 466 363 21% 518 691 -1 947 672 -776 823 
  O/w: Manufacturing 3 917 147 2 233 905 20% 451 062 -1 782 842 -715 192 
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Evaluation of the secondary effects and the overall impact of shocks 
 
For evaluation of the cumulative impact of the shocks described in the previous 
sections, we developed a further expansion of our basic input-output model. The model is 
presented in  Annex 2. The basic idea was to see to what extent losses in income 
aggregates that are derived from price and demand shocks would affect the total domestic 
demand, and thus output and GDP.  The model was developed based on several 
assumptions and simplifications.  
 
Specifically, while it appears from our analysis in the previous sections that gross 
operating margins for some industries deteriorated to an unsustainable level or even 
became negative, in our analysis in this section we ignored this finding. In other words, we 
allowed individual industrial sub-sectors to continue their operations, even though they 
generated negative gross value added.12 
 
 We estimated the cumulative effect of transitional shocks under three different sets 
of assumptions.  
 
1. Initially we produced the most restrictive scenario (A). It assumes: 
    
• full shift of the economy to world market prices 
• full demand shock 
• unchanged domestic demand structure 
• low level of the trade deficit, which was assumed to remain at the original pre-
transition level of 1.7percent of GDP 
 
The third assumption above is very restrictive and requires additional clarification. 
In a scenario A, we disregarded the fact that any changes in relative prices would alter 
domestic demand, consumption and saving patterns. It is obvious that market liberalization 
triggered a major shift in domestic demand that could produce some additional (and 
generally unknown) impact on the overall level of demand in the economy, depending on 
its particular structure. Unfortunately, in a  country with no history of the market economy, 
there is no rational way for modeling the private sector’s potential demand response of to 
such drastic relative price and real income changes.   
 
2.  In the second scenario (B) we relaxed the 3rd assumption above, i.e. we allowed for 
a shift in domestic demand in response to both the new income levels and the evolving 
institutional structure of the economy. We assigned new values to the shares of various 
components in the final demand by making them equal to actual demand shares observed 
in 1996. We selected 1996 because this was the first post-stabilization year in Armenia, 
and the national account statistics seems to be much more reliable than for earlier years 
that were characterized by high inflation. These old and new shares are summarized in 
                                                 
12 This assumption allows us to keep the structure of basic model intact. 
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Table 12, which indeed suggests that they are substantially different from those in the pre-
transition economy. This indicates that, during the first half of the 90-s, the Armenian 
economy evolved in a rather traditional way, i.e. it responded to the shocks in a way that is 
very similar to other market economies that went through liberalization and income 
decline. In particular, the share of private consumption in the total demand increased 
considerably, while within private consumption the shares of energy, food processing, 
agriculture and services had expanded. This could be interpreted as a sign that the 
Armenian economy was indeed largely liberalized in terms of removing domestic trade and 
price restrictions. 
  
3. The third scenario (C) is based on an additional relaxation of the 4th assumption 
above regarding the trade balance. We now assumed that during transition Armenia gained 
access to considerable financing of its trade deficit that increased in this scenario from the 
pre-transition level of 1.7percent to 32.7percent of GDP, which was the actual level of 
trade deficit in 1996.13 
 
Table 12. Structure of the Final Domestic Demand: 1987 current prices, 1987 world 
market prices, and 1996 current prices  
 
  Percent  (Share in nominal GDP) Percent  (Share in Total final demand) 
  
1987  
Current  
Prices 
1987  
World 
Market 
Prices 
1996 
Current 
Prices 
1987  
Current 
Prices 
1987  
World 
Market 
Prices 
1996  
Current  
Prices 
Final Domestic demand 101.2% 117.7% 132.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Final Consumption 68.5% 67.0% 104.2% 67.7% 57.0% 78.5% 
Private Final Consumption  55.9% 48.2% 97.4% 55.2% 41.0% 73.4% 
Food, beverages, tobacco 30.0% 20.9% 72.6% 29.7% 17.7% 54.7% 
Clothing and footwear 8.9% 4.2% 4.9% 8.8% 3.6% 3.7% 
Gross rents, fuel and power 2.6% 5.6% 7.0% 2.5% 4.8% 5.2% 
Household equipment 6.0% 6.8% 1.7% 5.9% 5.8% 1.3% 
Transport and communication 4.4% 6.6% 3.6% 4.4% 5.6% 2.7% 
Miscellaneous goods and services 3.9% 4.1% 7.6% 3.9% 3.5% 5.8% 
Government Consumption 12.7% 18.8% 14.2% 12.5% 16.0% 10.7% 
Gross Capital Formation  33.1% 50.6% 21.1% 32.7% 43.0% 15.9% 
Balance of imports and exports -1.7% -17.7% -32.7% -1.7% -15.0% -24.7% 
Gross Domestic Product 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 98.8% 85.0% 75.3% 
 Note: Government Consumption includes household consumption of services in public education and health, 
while Private Consumption excludes both.  
 
The selected results for all three scenarios are shown in Table 13. 
 
Table 13 suggests that the full downward effects of transitional shocks in Armenia 
were indeed very large. In Scenario B the estimated GDP shrank to only 15.2percent of its 
1987 dollarized value, while in Scenario C it diminished to 29.8percent of the 1987 value. 
 
 
                                                 
13 This deficit was mainly funded from three sources: Trade credits (Russia, Turkmenistan), donors’ 
assistance, and private transfers. All these inflows were basically a new post-socialist phenomenon. 
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Table 13. Main estimates for cumulative shock impact, in million $US 
  Initial, 1987 Memo:  Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
  
WMP 
estimates 
Isolated 
Impact of 
the Price 
Shock Restrictive 
Demand 
shift 
Increased 
trade deficit 
            
Output 12044 8185 1751 1880 3524 
GDP proxy 5217 3412 746 793 1555 
   as % of original GDP 100 65.4 14.3 15.2 29.8 
            
Export 2472.8 2472.8 526.9 526.9 526.9 
Import 3437.3 2531.2 539.6 540.7 1029.7 
Trade balance -964.5 -58.4 -12.7 -13.8 -502.8 
   As % of GDP -18.5 -1.7 -1.7 -1.7 -32.3 
 
In both cases the results derived from the model are worse than the Armenian 
GDP’s actual lowest level in the 90-s, which was 41percent of 1987 GDP in 1993. And 
this is despite the fact that the actual export in 1996 was only US$ 290 million, i.e. 1.8 
times lower than the value estimated by the model.  
 
 This suggests that the economy actually performed much better that one may 
expect based on its initial conditions and the severity of the shocks. The actual nominal 
GDP in 1996 (US$ 1,599 million) was close to the one projected under Scenario C and 
almost twice as high than the one in Scenarios A and B. This means that, in the real 
economy, the economic agents made a considerable adjustment to cope with the external 
shocks, which resulted in a better utilization of resources14. This scale of actual adjustment 
in the economy was even greater because, as mentioned before, the real shocks were 
stronger due to political and other factors, such as the earthquake, war, and blockade.  
 
Why did the economy perform better than one could expect? In our interpretation, 
market liberalization and economic reforms in general were the primary reason for this 
success. Liberalization provided economic agents with new incentives, which made them 
interested in adjusting their behavior, including through better utilization of available 
resources, more adequate production mix, and more rational consumption. From the very 
beginning, reforms in Armenia brought very positive results, in the sense that they pushed 
the economy to a more productive development path than that which existed in the pre-
transition period. Therefore, we believe that our results provide considerable support for 
the hypothesis that, under “the no-reforms scenario,” the impact of external shocks on the 
Armenian economy would have been much more painful. In other words, we did not find 
any evidence that the economy incurred any losses in excess of those which were 
unavoidable in the environment of severe external shocks, i.e. we identified no additional, 
“avoidable” costs associated with economic reforms. 
                                                 
14 In the model terms, such an adjustment is reflected through changes in the coefficients of the input-output 
matrix.  
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4. Conclusions—comparative impacts of various shocks 
 
Table 14 compares the size of various external shocks. The full impacts of price 
and demand shocks are very similar and amount to about one third of the initial 1987 GDP, 
while external financing of the trade deficit helps to recover about 15percent of the initial 
GDP by pushing up domestic demand.  
 
Table 14. Impacts of various shocks, million $US 
 
  Shock 
impact 
% of original 
GDP 
Residual GDP,  
after shock 
% of original 
GDP 
Initial GDP 5217     
Direct TOT impact -- losses in the  
trade balance 
-860 -16.48 4357 83.52 
Full TOT impact -1806 -34.62 3411 65.38 
  
Multiplier (1) 
 
2.1     
Direct impact of external demand loss (2) -2665 -51.08    
Total full impact of TOT and external 
demand 
 -4471  -85.70 746 14.30 
Effect of shift in domestic demand 47 0.9 793 15.20 
Full gain from external financing ($500 
mln) 
762 14.61 1555 29.81 
(1) It is interesting to note that the actual multiplier is very close to the conventionally assumed value of 2 
(Rodrik, 1992). 
(2) In excess of the price shock effect 
 
 Our results provide a rather dramatic picture of transitional challenges in Armenia. 
The full impact of external shocks was a loss of close to 85percent of the original GDP. 
We also obtained some evidence that several other small FSU economies were likely to be 
affected by shocks of the same magnitude. Armenia was not the most vulnerable 
republican economy in the USSR. 
 
Political independence and the accompanying economic liberalization came at the 
cost of the economy’s plummeting to a fundamentally different and lower income and 
development level than that to which the  Armenian population was accustom.. This 
resulted inter alia in a loss of ability to support a traditional level of public services. 
Market reforms have started from this extremely low point of economic development. 
While so far the reforms have not been able to recover the pre-transition level of 
consumption, this should not be interpreted either as an indication of economic 
mismanagement or a proof of flaws in the reform strategy. On the contrary, our results 
suggest that the reforms helped to smooth transitional pains, as should be expected. 
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Thus, a quick recovery of the pre-reform income levels was impossible and is still 
impossible in Armenia (at least without losing its political independence). This 
understanding should be more broadly publicized in order to adjust public expectations. It 
should also be taken into account when the government designs its industrial policy. 
 
A large part of the core of the traditional industrial sector in Armenia cannot be 
recovered. Its production cannot be re-oriented toward world markets without major 
investments, and Armenia does not have domestic savings of such magnitude. As a result, 
the country is facing the challenge of re-industrialization: building a largely new industrial 
structure that would be based on different types of industries, be linked to different types 
of markets, and have enterprises of different, much smaller size. This is a longer term 
restructuring process.  
 
 The basic driver of such restructuring seems to be export. Starting from the premise 
that Armenian development has to be export-oriented, the next question to ask is how to 
insert Armenian enterprises into global supply chains. Given Armenia’s existing 
endowments, there are two prospective types of supply chains for the country. Each, 
however, offers quite different development opportunities for Armenia, and each needs a 
special government strategy.15 
 
• Labor-intensive goods such as garments, footwear, basic assembling of consumer 
goods, etc. 
 
 This is a traditional specialization for many low- and middle-income countries. The 
major lesson for Armenia is that a key to success in this direction relates to developing 
strong links with global retailers that lead to an intensive transfer of managerial and 
marketing expertise.  
 
• Knowledge- and information-intensive goods and services such as software and 
development of electronic components. 
 
This could be the most attractive option for Armenia and, in fact, it has some 
chances of happening. India is a country from which Armenia could learn how to facilitate 
industrial expansion in this direction. Israel could be an interesting model to follow five or 
ten years down the road (but less so now). 
     
 In reality, future development will unavoidably combine these two strategic 
directions. However, the proportions in which they would mix are important. This will 
depend on a number of factors, such as the speed of upgrading management skills in the 
skill-based sectors, the country’s capacity to promote itself as an attractive place to make 
skill-based investments, and trends in both the stock of human capital and capabilities in 
the education system.16  
                                                 
15 These ideas were suggested to us by Yevgeny Kuznetsov. 
16 World Bank (2001) report provides additional analysis of Armenia’s options and challenges in the area of 
industrial policy. 
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Annex 1. The procedures for conversion of input-output accounts into the world 
market prices 
 
1. Tradables: 
Sectoral Outputs: 
• export prices were used for total output conversion for all sectors with 
export to output ratios in 1987 equal or more than 50percent and import 
to total domestic demand ratios equal or less than 50percent; 
• export-import weighted average prices for sectors with less than 
50percent export to output ratios and less than 50percent import to 
domestic demand ratios; and for sectors with more than 50percent 
export to output and more than 50percent import to domestic demand 
ratios; 
• import prices were used for all sectors with less than 50percent export to 
output and more than 50percent import to domestic demand ratios. 
  
Sectoral Inputs (Intermediary consumption): 
• inputs were converted by using corresponding output world market 
reference prices obtained as set out above.  
 
Sectoral Gross value added (GVA) 
• For all sectors GVA was estimated as the difference between sectoral 
Output and Input, done so in world market prices, as above. 
 
2. Non-tradables: 
 
It is worth noting that for non-tradable sectors re-estimation into the world market 
prices is much less trivial and requires making a number of simplifications. We explored 
only one possible approach, in which we assumed that when the economy moves to the 
world market prices for tradables, producing the previous amount of services/non-tradables 
in each sector would require the same volume of material inputs and some “reasonable” 
amount of gross value added to cover costs of the factors of production. The problem with 
this approach is that one has to predetermine the level of gross value added (GVA). We 
considered two options for calculating GVA in the non-tradable part of the economy as 
below, of which Option 1 was actually used for model simulations.  
 
Outputs: For all sectors Output = Input + GVA.  
 
Inputs: The same approach as was used for tradable sectors. 
 
GVA: (Option 1) 
• For each non-tradable sector: GVA (in world market prices) is 
calculated based on the conversion coefficients that are obtained for 
inputs. Thus sectoral GVA to Output ratios (in world market prices) are 
assumed to be equal to the actual 1987 GVA to Output ratios (estimated 
in 1987 current prices).    
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GVA: (Option 2) 
For each non-tradable sector: 
• Compensation of employees: Actual (in 1987 current prices) wage bill 
levels are deflated with the world market conversion coefficient (1 ruble 
= US$ 0.54), Which is derived from our estimates for final private 
consumption; 
• Consumption of fixed capital: Actual (in 1987 current prices) 
depreciation costs are deflated with the world market conversion 
coefficient (1 ruble = US$ 1.02) obtained for gross capital formation; 
and 
• Net operating surpluses assumed to amount to 5percent of total costs. 
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F- final consumption and gross capital formation 
 
FP – final private consumption 
 
G- government consumption 
 
CF- Gross capital formation 
 
(1) : (3) – indicate staged of iterations17. 
 
‘I- .i for columns and j for rows in the input–output table 
 
GDE- is for Gross Domestic Expenditures or Gross Domestic Demand 
 
 
         
 
                                                 
17 In the above set of equations some equations for stage (3) omitted because they are equal to those at the 
stage (2).  
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